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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 02483

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, FR
SUBJECT: ELECTIONS 1978: JACQUES CHIRAC AND THE RPR
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INTRODUCTION: THIS TELEGRAM IS PART OF A SERIES DESIGNED TO SITUATE THE MAIN POLITICAL PARTIES AS THEY GO INTO THE LAST SEVEN WEEKS OF THE CAMPAIGN. ON THE MAJORITY SIDE, THE ROLE AND PROBLEMS OF THE RPR AND ITS

PRESIDENT, JACQUES CHIRAC, ARE THE MOST COMPLEX. IN DISCUSSING THEM, WHAT CHIRAC IS DOING AND WHY, IT IS NECESSARY TO REMEMBER THAT (A) THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS OF MARCH ARE VIEWED AS ONLY A MAJOR BATTLE, NOT THE WAR; (B) WHATEVER THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTIONS, THE RPR BELIEVES FRANCE WILL ENTER A PERIOD OF GENUINE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INSTABILITY WHICH WILL MOST LIKELY RESULT IN ANOTHER ROUND OF LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS WITHIN A YEAR; AND (C) CHIRAC HAS HIS SIGHTS SET ON THE PRESIDENCY IN 1981. END INTRODUCTION

1. THE RPR IS THE LARGEST AND BEST ORGANIZED POLITICAL PARTY IN THE MAJORITY. IT HAS 90 DEPARTMENT FEDERATIONS, REPRESENTATIVES IN 450 OF THE 491 VOTING DISTRICTS AND OVER 500,000 ACTIVE MEMBERS. THE SUPPORTERS OF THE RPR CLOSELY APPROXIMATE (STATISTICALLY BY CATEGORY) THE POPULATION OF FRANCE EXCEPT IN TWO CATEGORIES (WORKERS, VOTERS 18 TO 24) WHERE THE RPR FALLS SIGNIFICANTLY BELOW THE NATIONAL AVERAGES. ITS MEMBERS INCLUDE 174 DEPUTIES OF THE OUTGOING NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, MANY OF WHOM AS LONG-TIME GAULLISTS, HAVE BEEN DIRECTING THE AFFAIRS OF FRANCE SINCE 1958 (MICHEL DEBRE, COUVE DE MURVILLE, PIERRE MESSMER, EDGAR FAURE, ETC.). IT HAS THUS FAR DESIGNATED 384 CANDIDATES (INCLUDING ALTERNATES), OF WHOM 95 ARE MEMBERS OF THE OUTGOING ASSEMBLY WHILE APPROXIMATELY 80 ARE CONSIDERED THE NEW BLOOD OF THE

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RPR -- LESS THAN 40 YEARS OF AGE. UNDER CHIRAC'S LEADERSHIP, THE RPR HAS DEVELOPED INTO A HIGHLY EFFICIENT POLITICAL MACHINE PROVIDING BRIEFING PAPERS, ELECTION PROPAGANDA, ELECTION TEAMS, AUTOMOBILES, MONEY, ETC., TO ITS CANDIDATES. OF ALL THE PARTIES IN THE MAJORITY, IT IS THE BEST EQUIPPED WITH MEN, MONEY AND MATERIAL TO COMPETE EFFECTIVELY THROUGHOUT FRANCE AND ITS OVERSEAS TERRITORIES.

2. CREATED IN DECEMBER 1976 TO SUCCEED THE UDR, WHICH HAD DEVELOPED AN IMAGE OF REPRESENTING FIXED INTERESTS AND WHICH HAD SUNK INTO THE DOLDRUMS FOLLOWING THE CHIRAC - CHABAN-DELMAS SPLIT AND THE ELECTION OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY CANDIDATE GISCARD D'ESTAING TO THE PRESIDENCY, THE RPR NOW REFLECTS THE IMAGE OF CHIRAC AND HIS CLOSE ADVISORS -- HARDWORKING, MILITANT, EFFICIENT, EFFECTIVE. THE RPR SEES ITSELF AS THE PRIMARY BASTION AGAINST THE THREAT FROM THE LEFT. ITS PRIMARY ELECTORAL STRATEGY IS TO AWAKEN THE FRENCH PEOPLE TO WHAT A VICTORY BY THE LEFT WOULD MEAN AND TO OFFER AN ALTERNATIVE RESPONSE TO PRESENT ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS. THE RPR HAS SOUGHT TO DEVELOP THE IMAGE OF A

FORCEFUL AND IMAGINATIVE POLITICAL PARTY, ANALYZING PROBLEMS, PROPOSING SOLUTIONS AND ENTERING INTO AN ACTIVE DEBATE WITH THE LEFT OVER THE FUTURE OF FRANCE.

3. THE RPR'S APPEAL TO THE VOTERS IS BASED PRIMARILY ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL THEMES: ACCELERATED GROWTH AND INCOME, DECENTRALIZATION, FISCAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE

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REFORM TO LESSEN THE BUREAUCRATIC BURDEN, INCREASED PRO-
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TECTION TO FARMERS FOR THEIR MARKETS, INCREASED BENEFITS TO FAMILIES, INCREASED REVENUES TO LOCAL ORGANS OF GOVERNMENT AND INCREASED LOCAL CONTROL -- A WIDE VARIETY OF REFORMS OFFERED TO APPEAL ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF FRENCH SOCIETY. ON THE NATIONAL LEVEL, IT OFFERS A MUCH MORE ACTIVIST PROGRAM THAN BARRE'S EMPHASIZING MORE EFFECTIVE NATIONAL PLANNING, INCREASED INVESTMENT, THE CREATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND MORE PROTECTION OF FRENCH INDUSTRY AND THE FRENCH MARKET -- IN GENERAL AN EXPANSIONIST PROGRAM TO STIMULATE ECONOMIC GROWTH AND RELIEVE WHAT IT CONSIDERS FRANCE'S MOST URGENT PROBLEM, UNEMPLOYMENT. CITING THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SITUATION, THE RPR ARGUES THAT FRANCE MUST BECOME MORE COMPETITIVE THROUGH INCREASED INVESTMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY. IT CRITICIZES BARRE AND HIS RECENTLY PRESENTED "ACTION OBJECTIVES" AS VAGUE AND TOO MODEST AND INDIRECTLY CITES GISCARD FOR "TINKERING" WITH REFORM. IT IS EVEN HARSHER IN ITS CRITICISM OF THE LEFT FOR PROPOSING POLICIES WHICH IT SAYS WOULD RESULT IN RUN-AWAY INFLATION REDUCING FRANCE'S COMPETITIVENESS AND REQUIRING PROTECTIONIST INSULATION OF THE ECONOMY. THE RPR STEADILY SEEKS TO EDUCATE THE FRENCH VOTER TO HIS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, THE ECONOMIC GOOD SENSE OF ITS APPROACH AND THE BUREAUCRATIC NIGHTMARE WHICH WOULD RESULT FROM A VICTORY OF THE LEFT.

4. JACQUES CHIRAC MUST BE SEEN NOT ONLY AS THE LEADER OF THE GAULLIST PARTY BUT ALSO AS ITS POTENTIAL CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENCY IN 1981. HE CONTROLS THE PARTY WITH A FIRM HAND, AND THERE IS EXCELLENT DISCIPLINE. CHIRAC IS A HIGHLY CAPABLE POLITICIAN AND AN EXCEPTIONAL CAMPAIGNER. ON THE HUSTINGS THROUGHOUT FRANCE SINCE LAST OCTOBER, HE SHAKES AN ESTIMATED 2,000 HANDS PER DAY, AND BY ELECTION DAY, OVER ONE MILLION PEOPLE WILL HAVE HEARD
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HIM SPEAK IN PERSON. HIS INTENSE PERSONAL AMBITION, HOWEVER, WHILE IT HAS GOTTEN HIM TO WHERE HE IS, OPENS HIM TO CHARGES OF INSINCERITY, OPPORTUNISM AND A LACK OF COMPREHENSIVE IDEAS. CHIRAC'S POPULARITY IN THE POLLS REMAINS LOW AS COMPARED WITH GISCARD, BARRE OR MITTERRAND. ON TELEVISION HE APPEARS HARD AND COMBATIVE. IN

PERSONAL APPEARANCES, HOWEVER, HE COMES ACROSS AS A SYMPATHETIC, LOCAL BOY -- SMILING, BABY KISSING, HAND SHAKING, ETC., THUS THE HEAVY EMPHASIS ON THE PERSONAL APPROACH.

5. IN THE PRESENT CAMPAIGN FOR THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS, THE RPR HAS ENTERED INTO A COMPETITIVE ALLIANCE WITH THE OTHER PARTIES OF THE MAJORITY, WHICH IN THEORY IS SUPPOSED TO OFFER A CHOICE BETWEEN THE GAULLIST AND GISCARDIAN ALTERNATIVES IN TERMS OF CANDIDATES AND POLICY AND TO ENCOURAGE MAXIMUM MAJORITY VOTER INTEREST AND PARTICIPATION. THERE WILL BE MAJORITY PRIMARIES IN APPROXIMATELY 75 PERCENT OF VOTING DISTRICTS. THE NUMBER AND TERMS OF THESE PRIMARIES, AS WELL AS THE PARTY AFFILIATION OF THE CANDIDATES, HAS PROVIDED THE BATTLE GROUND FOR A MINI-WAR BETWEEN THE RPR AND THE GISCARDIAN-CENTRISTS (PR, CDS AND RADICAL SOCIALISTS OF JJSS) (REFTEL). CHIRAC HAS ACCUSED THE OTHER MAJORITY PARTIES OF GANGING UP ON THE RPR CANDIDATES BY PRESENTING A LIST OF 363 COMBINED NON-RPR CANDIDATES. THIS LIST, WHICH INCLUDED RADICALS (THOUGH JJSS DID NOT SIGN THE MAJORITY MANIFESTO), ALLEGED THREATS TO COMPETE IN DISTRICTS PREVIOUSLY RESERVED BY ALL THE MAJORITY FOR A SINGLE RPR CANDIDATE AND VARIOUS LOCAL FRICTIONS BETWEEN RPR AND OTHER MAJORITY CANDIDATES, LED CHIRAC TO MAKE A STINGING ATTACK ON HIS ALLIES. THE LEADERS OF THE OTHER MAJORITY PARTIES CONTENTED THAT THE COMBINED NON-RPR LIST WAS NECESSARY TO AVOID SPLITTING THE MAJORITY SO WIDELY THAT NONE OF THE CANDIDATES RECEIVED THE 12.5 PERCENT REQUIRED FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE

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SECOND ROUND. THEY ALSO CONTENTED THAT THERE WAS NO "ANTI-RPR FRONT", ONLY AN EFFORT TO MAINTAIN "ORGANIZED" PLURALISM IN THE MAJORITY. IN SPITE OF THE POLEMICS, HOWEVER, AT NO TIME WAS THE AGREEMENT FOR MUTUAL SUPPORT OF THE LEADING MAJORITY CANDIDATE ON THE SECOND ROUND BROUGHT INTO QUESTION. AT THE PRESENT, BOTH SIDES ARE MAKING MOVES TOWARD RECONCILIATION. IT MUST ALSO BE REMEMBERED THAT, WHILE MUCH OF THE PRESS CAMPAIGN COVERAGE WILL FOCUS ON SUCH ANTICS OF THE PARTY LEADERS, MARCH 12 WILL SEE 491 SEPARATE ELECTIONS FOR MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, THE RESULTS OF WHICH WILL BE INFLUENCED AS MUCH BY LOCAL CONDITIONS AS BY THE DEBATE AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL.

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6. FOR THE RPR, THE SOCIALISTS CONSTITUTE THE PRIMARY
ENEMY IN THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN: FIRST BECAUSE THEY NOW

HAVE THE GREATEST POPULAR SUPPORT IN THE POLLS (27 PERCENT AS OPPOSED TO 21 PERCENT FOR THE RPR) AND SECONDLY BECAUSE OF THEIR POTENTIAL FOR BECOMING THE BIGGEST COMPONENT OF ANY FUTURE CENTER-LEFT GOVERNMENT. IN THIS RESPECT, THE RPR AND THE PCF (COMMUNISTS) HAVE REACHED THE SAME CONCLUSION ON THEIR PRIMARY TARGET. EACH FEELS THAT A PARTY REPRESENTING 27 PERCENT HAS SOME SLACK WHICH CAN BE RECAPTURED, AND EACH IS TRYING TO BRING THE PS DOWN TO SIZE TO PREVENT ANY MOVEMENT TOWARD THE GISCARDIAN CENTER-LEFT OPTION WHICH BOTH THE GAULLISTS AND COMMUNISTS FEAR. JACQUES CHIRAC'S BASIC OBJECTIVES ARE TO REDUCE THE RPR LOSSES IN MARCH FROM ITS CURRENT 174 SEATS (HIS GOAL IS 150 SEATS, WHILE THE GAULLISTS COULD ONLY HAVE HOPED FOR 100-130 BEFORE THE RPR WAS FORMED); TO MAINTAIN THE RPR AS THE MOST POWERFUL PARTY IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY EITHER IN THE MAJORITY OR, IN THE EVENT OF A LEFT VICTORY, IN THE OPPOSITION; AND TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR WINNING THE PRESIDENCY IN 1961. EACH OF THESE GOALS PRESENTS ITS OWN SET OF PROBLEMS.

7. CHIRAC MUST NOT ONLY DEFEND GAULLIST CONCEPTS BUT HE MUST ALSO MAINTAIN AN IMAGE OF BEING MORE THAN JUST THE LEADER OF ANOTHER PARTY IN THE MAJORITY. THE GAULLISTS FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE FIFTH REPUBLIC NO LONGER CONTROL EITHER THE PRESIDENCY OR THE PRIME MINISTRY, AND CHIRAC, WHILE LACKING GISCARD'S AND BARRE'S LEVERS OF POWER, MUST REMAIN AT LEAST INDEPENDENT OF THEIR CONTROL. WHEN IN CONFLICT WITH GOF POLICY, THIS ATTITUDE HAS LED CHIRAC, AS A SATURNCH SUPPORTER OF THE CONSTITUTION, TO ACT WITH DEFERENCE TOWARD THE PRESIDENT BUT TO DENY THAT THE PRIME MINISTER IS OR SHOULD BE A STRONG OR LEGITIMATE-CONFIDENTIAL

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TE FORCE IN THE COUNTRY. GISCARD, OF COURSE, SEEKS TO REDUCE RPR INDEPENDENCE BY RELEGATING ITS LEADER TO THE SAME LEVEL AS THE LEADER OF ANOTHER PARTY IN THE MAJORITY -- WITNESS HIS WISH FOR PRESIDENT CARTER NOT TO VISIT THE PARIS CITY HALL. THIS SYMBOLIC WARFARE AS WELL AS THEIR DEEP PERSONAL ANIMOSITY ONLY ADDS FUEL TO THE GENUINE POLITICAL CONFLICT OVER PROGRAMS AND POLICIES. CHIRAC AND MOST OF THE OTHER GAULLISTS BASICALLY BELIEVE IN AN INDEPENDENT, LIBERAL, CAPITALIST FRANCE -- WITH GAULLISTS AT THE HEAD OF IT. GISCARD'S VISION OF A CENTER-LEFT MAJORITY GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT ONLY RESULT IN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES WITH WHICH THE RPR DOES NOT AGREE, BUT WOULD ALSO CONSIGN THE RPR TO A GHETTO ONLY SLIGHTLY LESS REMOVED FROM THE CENTER OF POWER THAN THAT OF THE COMMUNISTS.

8. WHILE CHIRAC WANTS THE PRESENT MAJORITY TO MAINTAIN

ITS CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT AFTER MARCH, HE WANTS EVEN MORE TO MAINTAIN THE POWER OF THE GAULLIST PARTY IN THAT MAJORITY. TO THE VOTERS, THE RPR OFFERS ITS OWN PROGRAM TO BE IMPLEMENTED IN CASE OF VICTORY, OR AS A HOPE FOR THE FUTURE IN CASE OF DEFEAT. CHIRAC BELIEVES THAT GISCARD'S IDEA FOR A CENTER-LEFT GOVERNMENT WITH SOCIALIST PARTICIPATION IS UNWORKABLE AND THAT A VICTORY BY THE LEFT WOULD BRING ABOUT ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DISASTER. THEREFORE, HIS OBJECTIVE IS TO MAINTAIN SUFFICIENT POLITICAL POWER AT THE GRASS ROOTS AND IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TO PREVENT IMPLEMENTATION OF GISCARD'S OPTION IN CASE OF A MAJORITY VICTORY OR TO PROVIDE THE BASE FOR THE FUTURE ELECTION CAMPAIGN WHICH WOULD FOLLOW A LEFT VICTORY AND THE PRESUMED SUBSEQUENT CHAOS. AGAIN THIS BRINGS HIM INTO CONFLICT WITH GISCARD, AND BOTH MEN FORESEE THIS COMPETITION CONTINUING TO THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OF 1981.

8. WHILE BOTH CHIRAC AND GISCARD AGREE ON THE DESIRABILITY OF A MAJORITY VICTORY IN MARCH, THEY DO NOT AGREE ON THE TERMS OF THAT VICTORY AND BOTH SEE IT AS ONLY A MAJOR BATTLE IN A PROTRACTED WAR. IN THIS WAR, CHIRAC HAS A MAJOR DISADVANTAGE AND TWO MAJOR ADVANTAGES. THE DISADVANTAGE IS THAT GAULLISM RESPECTS THE PRESIDENCY AND ABHORS GOVERNMENT BY POLITICAL PARTIES, AS EXEMPLIFIED BY THE FOURTH REPUBLIC. FOR THAT REASON, CHIRAC IS LIMITED IN HIS ABILITY TO ATTACK GISCARD, OR AT TIMES EVEN HIS CHOSEN GOVERNMENT. IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, CHIRAC'S OPEN OPPOSITION TO GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS HAS BEEN LIMITED. CONCERNING THE INTRA-MAJORITY COMPETITION WITH THE GISCARDIANS, EVEN THOUGH CHIRAC AND THE RPR LEADERSHIP HAVE BEEN AWARE FOR SOME TIME THAT SUPPORTERS OF THE PRESIDENT WERE TRYING TO REDUCE THEIR STRENGTH

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LITY OF A MAJORITY VICTORY IN MARCH, THEY DO NOT AGREE ON THE TERMS OF THAT VICTORY AND BOTH SEE IT AS ONLY A MAJOR BATTLE IN A PROTRACTED WAR. IN THIS WAR, CHIRAC HAS A MAJOR DISADVANTAGE AND TWO MAJOR ADVANTAGES. THE DISADVANTAGE IS THAT GAULLISM RESPECTS THE PRESIDENCY AND ABHORS GOVERNMENT BY POLITICAL PARTIES, AS EXEMPLIFIED BY THE FOURTH REPUBLIC. FOR THAT REASON, CHIRAC IS LIMITED IN HIS ABILITY TO ATTACK GISCARD, OR AT TIMES EVEN HIS CHOSEN GOVERNMENT. IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, CHIRAC'S OPEN OPPOSITION TO GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS HAS BEEN LIMITED. CONCERNING THE INTRA-MAJORITY COMPETITION WITH THE GISCARDIANS, EVEN THOUGH CHIRAC AND THE RPR LEADERSHIP HAVE BEEN AWARE FOR SOME TIME THAT SUPPORTERS OF THE PRESIDENT WERE TRYING TO REDUCE THEIR STRENGTH

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THROUGH ELECTORAL TACTICS, THEY SURFACED THE SPLIT ONLY
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WHEN IT BECAME OBVIOUS TO RPR CANDIDATES AND THEIR SUP-
PORTERS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY THAT THE GISCARDIANS'
TACTICS COULD COST THEM THE ELECTION. CHIRAC'S STRENGTH
COMES FROM BEING HEAD OF THE BIGGEST AND BEST DISCIPLI-
NED PARTY IN THE MAJORITY. CHIRAC BROUGHT THE NEEDED
GAULLIST SUPPORT TO GISCARD IN 1974. THAT SUPPORT HAS
GRADUALLY BEEN WHITTLED DOWN. CHIRAC'S SECOND ADVANTAGE
IS THAT WHILE A CENTER-LEFT COALITION TO GOVERN FRANCE
WOULD BE TAILOR MADE FOR GISCARD'S IDEAL (AND REELEC-
TION), THE SOCIALIST PARTY LED BY MITTERRAND HAS NO VES-
TED INTEREST IN HELPING HIM TO THAT GOAL.

9. CONCLUSION: IN THE MARCH ELECTIONS, THE RPR WILL RETAIN ITS ROLE AS THE DOMINANT PARTY IN THE PRESENT MAJORITY POLITICAL GROUPINGS, DECREASING IN STRENGTH, HOWEVER -- TO APPROXIMATELY 140 SEATS, A LOSS OF ABOUT 35. SUPPORT BY MAJORITY PARTIES FOR EACH OTHER'S CANDIDATES IN THE SECOND ROUND WILL PROBABLY BE FAIRLY GOOD. THE RPR STILL BELIEVES THE MAJORITY CAN WIN IF INTRA-MAJORITY RIVALRY CAN BE KEPT WITHIN BOUNDS. POLEMICS BETWEEN THE RPR AND ITS MAJORITY PARTNERS WILL CONTINUE IN SPURTS AS CHIRAC MAINTAINS GAULLIST IDENTITY, BUT NOT TO THE POINT OF AN OPEN BREAK.

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